A Fiduciary Choice:

Taking the Witness
Stand or Taking a
Stand for Your
Employees

Presented by:

Matthew Eickman, J.D. AIF®

Director of ERISA Services

October 24, 2019



Your Comprehensive Fiduciary Partner





The Price of Bad Answers



Sacerdote et al v. New York University

Case 1:16-cv-06284-KBF Document 348 Filed 07/31/18 Page 1 of 78

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF NEW YORK

SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF NEW YORK

DR. ALAN SACERDOTE, DR. HERBERT SAMUELS, MARK CRISPIN MILLER, PATRICK LAMSON-HALL, MARIE E. MONACO, DR. SHULAMITH LALA STRAUSSNER, and JAMES B. BROWN, individually and as representatives of a class of participants and beneficiaries on behalf of the NYU School of Medicine Retirement Plan for Members of the Faculty, Professional Research Staff and Administration and the New York University Retirement Plan for Members of the Faculty, Professional Research Staff and Administration,

Plaintiffs.

-V-

NEW YORK UNIVERSITY.

Defendant.

DATE FILED: July 31, 2018

USDC SDNY DOCUMENT

16-cv-6284 (KBF)

OPINION & ORDER



The Prid

The second co-chairs were, at various times, Linda Woodruff, Patricia Halley, and others. Meagher's testimony was concerning. She made it clear that she viewed her role as primarily concerned with scheduling, paper movement, and logistics; she displayed a surprising lack of in-depth knowledge concerning the financial aspects of managing a multi-billion-dollar pension portfolio and a lack of true appreciation for the significance of her role as a fiduciary. In a number of instances, she

\V//

current 348 Fried 07/31/18 Page 25 of 76

ension portfolio and a lack of true appreciatio

recordkeeper for annuity assets) was the favored vendo

Plaintiffs' second claim is that the Committee acted remove the TLAA Seal Estate Account and the CREF Scotl options (thereby continuing to allow plaintiffs to invest in a senset that the Committee used confusing and inappropria to review their performance and that these funds objective resulting in significant lenses.

After careful review of the record, the Court finds by

to test the reliability of their information. (Tr. at 126:13-128:8.) She bluntly

testified that "[i]t's not my job to determine whether the fees are appropriate" for

the Plans. (Id. at 126:3-9.)

Meagher's supervisor, Sanchez, 37 also a Committee member, was similarly

unfamilian with basic concents relating to the Plans such as who fulfilled the role of

387:24.) This suggested that Sanchez does not view herself as having adequate

atoils. Sanchez responded that she has a "big job" urees role, not her Committee membership; and that one of many responsibilities she has. [Id. at 386.5]

time to serve effectively on the Committee.

("Cammack").

¹² Dorph, now NYU's Executive Vice President and a Committee member until 2017, also provided somewhat concerning testimony. For instance, on the first day of his testimony, he did not even know whether he was currently a member of the Committee (and, accordingly, whether he was a fiduciary to thousands of employees). (Tr. at 1311:3-6; see also DX888 ("Dorph Decl.").) However, his testimony regarding NYU's information technology ("IT") transitions and their impact on



The Price of Bad Answers



United States Court of Appeals

For the Eighth Circuit

No. 12-2056

Ronald C. Tussey; Charles E. Fisher; Timothy Pinnell

Plaintiffs - Appellees

v.

ABB, Inc.; John W. Cutler, Jr.; Pension Review Committee of ABB, Inc.; Pension & Thrift Management Group of ABB, Inc.; Employee Benefits Committee of ABB, Inc.

Defendants - Appellants

Fidelity Management Trust Company; Fidelity Management & Research Company



The Price of Bad Answers

The dictrict count's factout fleckers find conde-of



monitor fran recordkeeping costs based on the ADD fiduciaries specific failings in this case. The district court found, as a matter of fact, that the ABB fiduciaries failed to (1) calculate the amount the Plan was paying Fidelity for recordkeeping through revenue sharing, (2) determine whether Fidelity's pricing was competitive, (3) adequately leverage the Plan's size to reduce fees, and (4) "make a good faith" effort to prevent the subsidization of administration costs of ABB corporate services" with Plan assets, even after ABrdkeeping services and cautioned that the revenue sharing Fidel overpaying for recordkeepin Plan might have been subsidizing the other corporate services ABB did not act on the information it received.

uciaries] violated their fiduciary duties to the Plan when monitor recordkeeping costs, failed to negotiate rebates for the clear control to the cost of the clear control to the cost of the clear control to the cost of the clear cost of the clear cost of the clear cost of the cost of the clear cost of th either Fidelity or other investment companies chosen to be

3d 5a1, 546 (8th Cir. 2002)); see also Fed. R. Civ. P. 52(a)(8)



Our Roadmap





- 1) Understanding Responsibilities
- 2) Investments Generally
- 3) Target Date Funds
- 4) Benchmarking
- 5) Modernizing



Ignorance is Not Bliss



```
DEPOSITION OF PLAN SPONSOR
2
        ATTORNEY: What do you know about your
   fiduciary responsibilities?
4
         PLAN SPONSOR: I'm not a fiduciary. We
   have a broker.
6
        ATTORNEY: Is your broker a fiduciary?
         PLAN SPONSOR: I assume so. He and our
   TPA handle our investments.
9
        ATTORNEY: What is a fiduciary's primary
   responsibility?
11
         PLAN SPONSOR: To protect ourselves so
    our company doesn't get sued.
13
14
15
16
17
```



Fiduciary Rule Headlines



planadviser

January 24, 2019

State-Based Fiduciary Regulations Take Shape in 2019

PLANSPONSOR

May 23, 2019

DOL Anticipates Proposing Another Fiduciary Rule This Year

P&I

June 24, 2019

DOL could ride on the back of the Reg BI for fiduciary rule

InvestmentNews

September 10, 2019

A new litigation saga begins for another 'best interest' rule



Fiduciary Responsibility



Fiduciary's Duties:
"the highest known
to the law"

1

- 1 Duty of *Loyalty*
- 2 Duty of *Prudence*
- 3 Duty to *Diversify Investments*
- Responsibility to Follow the Plan's Terms
- 5 Duty to Monitor Service Providers



Fiduciary Responsibility



- **✓** Do your fiduciaries *know who they are?*
- ✓ Are your fiduciaries educated?
- **✓** Are they receiving *frequent education from:*









Conferences





ERISA does NOT impose a duty to mitigate risk or merely to protect one's self.

A good fiduciary is a proactive – not a defensive – one.



How a Conversation SHOULD Go



```
DEPOSITION OF PLAN SPONSOR
        ATTORNEY: What do you know
   about your fiduciary
   responsibilities?
5
        PLAN SPONSOR: At our company,
   we start by identifying each of our
   fiduciaries.
        ATTORNEY: And then?
        PLAN SPONSOR: They receive
   education - onboarding training and
11
   ongoing education from our advisor.
12
        ATTORNEY: And how would you
13
   summarize what you've learned from
14 that education?
15
         PLAN SPONSOR: Our committee
   members clearly understand their core
```



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   summarize what you've learned from
   that education?
        PLAN SPONSOR: Our committee
   members clearly understand their core
```

```
17
     DEPOSITION OF PLAN SPONSOR
   responsibilities. We also have
   implemented several best practices.
20
        ATTORNEY: And this allows you
   to avoid being sued?
22
        PLAN SPONSOR: Well we don't
   think like that. We focus on making
   decisions in our participants' best
   interests. Our advisor always says:
   the safest fiduciaries are the
   proactive ones.
```



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"We've Got Good Funds and I Cannot Lie"



```
DEPOSITION OF PLAN SPONSOR
        ATTORNEY: How do you accomplish
   not being sued?
        PLAN SPONSOR: Use good funds.
        ATTORNEY: How do you know if
   they're good?
        PLAN SPONSOR: I don't know but
  our broker and TPA are good with that
   stuff. Our plan has good returns.
10
        ATTORNEY: Do you have an
   Investment Policy Statement?
        PLAN SPONSOR: Our attorney and
12
   auditor told us not to have one
   because we wouldn't follow it.
        ATTORNEY: Do you have a process
   for reviewing share classes?
```



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   because we wouldn't follow it.
        ATTORNEY: Do you have a process
15
   for reviewing share classes?
```

```
17
      DEPOSITION OF PLAN SPONSOR
18
         PLAN SPONSOR: We don't share
   classes with others.
20
        ATTORNEY: Have you asked about
   collective investment trusts?
        PLAN SPONSOR: I don't know, but
   we definitely trust our investments
   to be collectively awesome. Is that
   what you meant?
```

Litigation Headlines




P&I December 24, 2018 401(k) suits point to need for litigation risk prevention WSJ May 8, 2019 A New Fight Breaks Out Over 401(k) Fees **InvestmentNews** August 6, 2019 401(k) lawsuits creeping down to smaller plans **InvestmentNews** October 2, 2019 401(k) lawsuits get more complex



Fee Lawsuits: Second Wave





Greg lacurci, "Jerry Schlichter's fee lawsuits have left an indelible mark on the 401(k) industry", *Investment News*, September 2017.

Carmen Castro-Pagan, "These Law Firms Led the Way in Filing Benefit Class Actions", *Bloomberg Law: Big Law Business*, November 2017.



(%)

Kirk v. Retirement Committee of CHS/Community Health Systems, Inc. (M.D. Tenn. Aug. 2019)

Allegations focused on index funds

1. Proprietary bias

- Used the recordkeeper's proprietary products
- "Given [the recordkeeper's] conflicts of interest, the CHS Defendants should have closely scrutinized [the recordkeeper's] choice of investments for the TDF separate accounts and its management of those accounts."

2. Excessive costs

- "despite fees that were several times higher than marketplace alternatives that tracked the exact same index"
- "The investment fiduciary must further consider which share class of the investment vehicle to use."

3. Tracking error

 "Compared to marketplace alternatives, [the] index funds deviated further from the benchmark index, and consistently had the worst performance even on a pre-fee basis."

"Given the high fees and history of poor performance of [these] index funds, a prudent fiduciary acting in the best interests of the Plan's participants would have removed these index funds from the Plan and replaced them with more competitive marketplace alternatives."



Anderson v. Intel Corp. (N.D. Cal. Aug. 2019)



1. Two participant-directed plans:

Nearly \$12 billion and more than \$6.5 billion

2. Committee Management:

- Committees responsible for:
 - Core funds list
 - Target date funds (TDFs) built from core funds
 - Risk-based model portfolios (Models) built from core funds

3. Portfolio Composition and Operations

- The TDFs and Models both included hedge funds, private equity funds, and commodities funds (in addition to more traditional components)
- They were maintained via a recordkeeper product (and not as collective investment trusts, until recently)



Anderson v. Intel Corp. (N.D. Cal. Aug. 2019), cont.



Plaintiffs allege that the Committees, their members, and the company breached fiduciary responsibilities because of the following:

1. Imprudent Risk:

- ➤ Use of risky component funds (e.g., hedge funds and private equity; the complaint uses the word "hedge fund" 280 times)
- ➤ Concentration: those funds making up 27-37% of the TDFs and up to 56% of the Models at various times

2. High Costs:

- Failed to exert leverage of over \$18 billion of combined plan assets
- > TDF expenses ranged from 82 to 109 basis points in various years
- ➤ Model expenses ranged from 125 to 208 basis points in various years
- Failure to use CITs (until recently)

3. Performance Not in Line with Risk or Cost

4. Conflicts of Interest

➤ Many of the high-risk funds were managed by companies engaged in outside investments with Intel Capital



Best Practices









Our Roadmap





- 1) Understanding Responsibilities
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- 5) Modernizing



Missing the Target?



```
DEPOSITION OF PLAN SPONSOR
2
        ATTORNEY: Do you use target date
3
   funds?
        PLAN SPONSOR: We do.
        ATTORNEY: How did you choose
6
   them?
        PLAN SPONSOR: I can't remember.
   I think our recordkeeper suggested
   them.
        ATTORNEY: How do you monitor
    those?
        PLAN SPONSOR: We don't need to.
12
   They're our default. They're our
   "QDIA".
14
15
       ATTORNEY: So how do you know
16 how they perform?
```



Missing the Target?



```
DEPOSITION OF PLAN SPONSOR
        ATTORNEY: Do you use target date
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        ATTORNEY: So how do you know
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```

```
DEPOSITION OF PLAN SPONSOR
17
        PLAN SPONSOR: Our recordkeeper
18
    says they're good.
```





Two levels of allegations

1. Imprudent Initial Decision

- in 2013, added TDFs that were "chronic poor performers"
- when added:
 - had been underperforming both the Plan's benchmark and the Morningstar Lifetime Moderate Index
 - had been outperformed by Fidelity, T. Rowe Price, and Vanguard, which have similar management styles

2. Imprudent Ongoing Decisions to Retain

- failed to remove TDFs "despite their abysmal underperformance for almost a decade"
- most of the TDFs have performed worse than between 70% and 95% of peer group options

"The overall breadth and depth of the [TDFs'] underperformance raises a plausible inference that Walgreen's selection and monitoring process was tainted by a failure of competency or effort."



How the Conversation SHOULD Go



```
DEPOSITION OF PLAN SPONSOR
        ATTORNEY: Do you use target date
3
   funds?
        PLAN SPONSOR: We do.
        ATTORNEY: How did you choose
   them?
        PLAN SPONSOR: Our advisor
   described differences in glide paths,
   "to" vs. "through", active vs.
   passive, fees, and management style.
   We also studied returns.
        ATTORNEY: How do you monitor
12
13
   those?
14
         PLAN SPONSOR: Our IPS sets out
   criteria. We look at that every
   year, at least.
```



How the Conversation SHOULD Go



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        ATTORNEY: How do you monitor
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13
14
         PLAN SPONSOR: Our IPS sets out
   criteria. We look at that every
   year, at least.
```

DEPOSITION OF PLAN SPONSOR ATTORNEY: So how do you know how 18 they perform? 19 20 PLAN SPONSOR: Our investment consultant evaluates them relative to their peer group, both in terms of performance and expense, and reports on that to us. And we document that review and report in our minutes.



Our Roadmap





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A Job Ain't Nuthin' But Work



```
DEPOSITION OF PLAN SPONSOR
2
       ATTORNEY: When did you last
3
   benchmark your retirement plan?
       PLAN SPONSOR: It's been a long
5
   time.
       ATTORNEY: Why?
        PLAN SPONSOR: I don't want to
   have to move the plan.
       ATTORNEY: Why would you have to
  move the plan?
        PLAN SPONSOR: Well, we like our
   guy. He's been with us for a long
   time. And I don't want to have to
   move the plan.
       ATTORNEY: Why would you have to
  move the plan?
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         ATTORNEY: Why would you have to
    move the plan?
10
11
          PLAN SPONSOR: Well, we like our
    guy. He's been with us for a long
     time. And I don't want to have to
13
    move the plan.
14
          ATTORNEY: Why would you have to
15
     move the plan?
16
```


```
DEPOSITION OF PLAN SPONSOR
         PLAN SPONSOR: If we found
18
    something better.
19
20
        ATTORNEY: Okay, so you're
   prepared to tell employees that you
   just didn't want to do your job?
```



Consider the Health Insurance Shopping Process



Does a plan sponsor...



Consider the Health Insurance Shopping Process



Or does a plan sponsor . . .



Why is a Retirement Benchmarking Process So Different?



- ? Shouldn't many of the same considerations apply?
- ? Shouldn't a CFO and HR Department be similarly motivated?
- ALSO: with 401(k) plans, there's an additional layer of fiduciary responsibility and risk.

Benchmarking: Why?









Forman v. TriHealth, Inc. (S.D. Ohio July 2019)



Complaint includes these charts:

TriHealth's Plan Benchmarked Against Plans With Similar Number of Participants

Plan Asset Percentage Cost Per Head TriHealth 0.86% \$328.01 Peer Plans 90%tile 0.63% \$237.00 Peer Plans 50%tile 0.43% \$161.01 0.44% Peer Plans Mean \$165.53 0.92% TriHealth 5257.35 0.63% \$175.82 Peer Plans 90% tile Peer Plans 50%tile 0.43% \$119.45 Peer Plans Mean 0.39% \$108.84 0.96% \$217.36 TriHealth 0.63% \$141.62 Peer Plans 90%tile 2015 Peer Plans 50%tile 0.43% \$96.21 0.44% \$98.91 Peer Plans Mean 1.05% \$193.03 Peer Plans 90%tile 0.63% \$115.71 Peer Plans 50%tile 0.43% \$78.61 0.44% \$80.81 Peer Plans Mean TriHealth 1.00% \$151.88 Peer Plans 90% tile 0.63% \$96.63 Peer Plans 50%tile 0.43% \$65.64 Peer Plans Mean 0.44% \$67,48 TriHealth's Plan Benchmarked Against Plans With Similar Plan Asset Size

	Plan	Asset Percentage
2017	TriHealth	0.86%
	90%tile Comp	0.63%
	50%tile Comp	0.28%
	Mean Comp	0.41%
20 <mark>1</mark> 6	TriHealth	0.92%
	90%tile Comp	0.63%
	50%tile Comp	0.28%
	Mean Comp	0.41%
2015	TriHealth	0.96%
	90%tile Comp	0.63%
	50%tile Comp	0.28%
	Mean Comp	0.41%
2014	TriHealth	1.05%
	90%tile Comp	0.65%
	50%tile Comp	0.51%
	Mean Comp	0.47%
2013	TriHealth	1.00%
	90%tile Comp	0.65%
	50%tile Comp	0.51%
	Mean Comp	0.47%

"As illustrated above, the TriHealth Plan's administrative fees are consistently the highest among its comparator peers, regardless whether the comparison is based on cost per participant or percentage."



Montgomery v. H-E-B (W.D. Tex. Sept. 2019)



1. Participant-directed plans:

More than \$2.5 billion in plan assets

2. General Allegations:

- "[T]he *Plan's fees were, at a minimum, nearly three times the average* and at least 50% higher than the 90th percentile, making it *one of the most expensive plans in the country* with over \$1 billion in assets."
- "Defendants failed to prudently monitor the expenses charged within the Plan's index funds . . . [which] were up to *seven times higher* than comparable alternative index funds"
- "Defendants utilized an internal team to design and manage the [target-risk funds], with no previous experience managing investments for defined-contribution plans."
- Also: failure to monitor alternatives to money market fund, self-dealing payments of millions of dollars from the plan to H-E-B, and failed to investigate a reasonable share of returns for the Plan's securities lending program

3. Particularly Noteworthy

- The complaint alleges that the fees were imprudent because they "were not attributable to enhanced services for participants"
- This is a rare admission from plaintiffs' counsel that price may not be the only key aspect and that, instead, value is relevant



Benchmarking Goals



Positive Attitude:

- Better Pricing?
- Better Service?
- A Combination of Both?

Do Not Fear a Move

- The goal is NOT to transition the plan
- This will happen only if the results show the current situation to be inferior



How a Conversation SHOULD Go



```
DEPOSITION OF PLAN SPONSOR
2
        ATTORNEY: When did you last
   benchmark your retirement plan?
        PLAN SPONSOR: Two years ago.
        ATTORNEY: What did you
   benchmark?
        PLAN SPONSOR: Everything -
   investments, advisor, recordkeeper.
        ATTORNEY: And what did you
10
   learn?
11
        PLAN SPONSOR: That there was a
   lot more out there for our employees.
   We upgraded the tools. We changed
13
   share classes and our QDIA. And we
   lowered our costs.
        ATTORNEY: When will you do this
16
17 again?
```



How a Conversation SHOULD Go



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   share classes and our QDIA. And we
   lowered our costs.
        ATTORNEY: When will you do this
16
17 again?
```

```
DEPOSITION OF PLAN SPONSOR
18
        PLAN SPONSOR: In a year or two.
19
        ATTORNEY: That seems like a lot
   of work.
21
        PLAN SPONSOR: It's worth it. It
   helps us to make sure we do right by
   our employees.
```



Our Roadmap





- 1) Understanding Responsibilities
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- 5) Modernizing

Reimagine Your Retirement Program Structure





"Why do we have our plan(s)?"

"What are we trying to accomplish?"

"Why do employees participate – or not participate – in our plan?"

"Why do we use our current matching or profit sharing structure?"

"What other services are available?"





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Your Comprehensive Fiduciary Partner

Thank you!